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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and
unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic
and business changes become the unreasonable price of tommorrow. Once es-
tablished, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition
secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which
create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable
or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particu-
lar price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the govern-
ment in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to
day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic
conditions. Moreover, in the absence of express legislation requiring it, we
should hesitate to adopt a construction making the difference between legal and
illegal conduct in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a test
as to whether prices are reasonable-a determination which can be satisfactorily
made only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice
between rival philosophies.
Thus viewed, the Sherman Law is not only a prohibition against the infliction
of a particular type of public injury. It is a limitation of rights . . . . which
may be pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained.
In the Standard Oil Case where, in considering the Freight Assn. Case, the
court said (221 U.S.) p. 65:
"That, as considering the contracts or agreements, their necessary effect and
the character of the parties by whom they were made, they were clearly restraints
of trade within the purview of the statute, they could not be taken out of that
category by indulging in general reasoning as to the expediency or non-expediency
of having made the contracts or the wisdom or want of wisdom of the statute
which prohibited their being made. That is to say, the cases but decided that
the nature and character of the contracts, creating as they did a conclusive pre-
sumption which brought them within the statute, such -result was not to be dis-
regarded by the substitution of a judicial appreciation of what the law ought
to be for the plain judicial duty of enforcing thelaw as it was made."
H.W.I.
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"Honor thy father and thy mother."
If the fourth commandment was never announced by any of the
writers of the common law (because no case involving a child's suit
against its natural parent was ever brought before the courts of
England) it was unmistakably and indelibly carved upon the tablets
of Mount Sinai and by the recent case of Wick v. Wick,1 firmly fixed
in the jurisprudence of our commonwealth-Wisconsin. This was an
action brought against the defendant by his infant child, under the age
of fourteen years, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
by plaintiff as a result of an automobile accident due to the negligence
of the defendant. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and
the appeal from the order overruling the demurrer presented the ques-
tion of whether an infant child may maintain an action in tort against
its parent.
In answering this question in the negative, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court based its decision on the dictates of the Natural Law and on
considerations of public policy. Said the court:
.NOTES AND COMMENT
To permit a child to maintain an action in tort against the parent is to intro-
duce discord and contention where the laws of nature have established peace
and obedience. Natural instinct condemns such proceedings as most unseemly,
and the laws of society will not, to the detriment of society, defeat the benign
influence of the laws of nature.
The authorities are unanimous in their condemnation of such an
action by the child, with the single exception of one dissenting opinion.2
The only argument in favor of sanctioning a recovery in cases like the
present seems to be that on principle, there is no reason why the
parent should not be subject to civil responsibility similar to that of
a guardian or teacher, who, though standing in loco parentis, is liable
for excessive punishment.3 This argument, however, is more than over-
come by practical considerations of public policy, which discourage
causes of action that tend to destroy parental authority and to under-
mine the security of the home. It would, indeed, be rendering a dis-
service to the child to teach it to stray from the path of rectitude, or
permit its mind to be poisoned by ideas of disloyalty and dishonor.
Of course, it must not be forgotten that the child is protected
against excessive punishment at the hand of the parent by the criminal
laws.
4
Diametrically opposed to the communistic theory which Russia has
sought to put into practice is that of our United States which main-
tains the family as the social unit.
The members thereof are of the same blood ..... bound together by the
strongest natural ties. Society .... has a deep interest in maintaining .... the
natural conception of the family unit. This imputes authority to the parent and
requires obedience of the child.5
Nor does the nature or the magnitude of the -injury done by the
parent change the rule. In Roller v. Roller,; the parent had been con-
victed of committing a rape on his minor daughter (plaintiff in the
civil action). The cause of action was denied in the child. The court
refused to let a hard case make hard law. Further, it said:
To permit a minor child to sue its father for a tortious wrong would be to
allow the child to take from the parent that which is already dedicated to its
support and maintenance, because the law says that a parent must provide
according to his means for the support, care and maintenance of his minor
children and such action would allow one minor child to gain an advantage over
'Not reported at this writing. Opinion filed, March 7, 1927. (Wisconsin.)
2 Clark, in Small v. Morrison, II8 S.E. 12 (17). Cf. Cooley on Torts, 3rd Ed.,
pp. 40, 493; Jaggard on Torts, 462; Schouler on Domestic Relations, 3rd Ed., Sec.
275; 20 R.C.L. 63; 29 Cyc. 1663; McKelvey v. McKelvey, iii Tenn. 388, 77 S.W.
664; Smith v. Smith, 142 N.E. I28; Mation v. Manion, (N.J.), 129 Atl. 431;
Hewellette v. George (Miss.) 9 So. 885, in -which the infant plaintiff couldn't
sue even after separation from parent and marriage.
'Cooley on Torts, 2nd Ed., 198. See Clasen v. Bruhs (Neb.), 95 N.W. 640.
Allowed against aunt.
" Cooley on Torts, 3rd Ed., pp. 40, 265, 294, 493.
'Wick v. Wick, supra.
37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788.
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his minor brothers and sisters at the expense of the common fund which has
been dedicated to a fair and equal support of them all.
Although it is stated in Taubert v. Taubert,7 that an emancipated
minor child has such a tort cause of action against its natural parent,
that right is expressly denied in Matarese v. Matarese.s  An action
upon the child's majority against the father, or on the latter's death,
against his estate, would destroy the harmony of the family as surely
as would a suit during minority.
Whatever may be the views of certain eminent jurists,9 the prin-
ciples of the Natural Law are firmly imbedded in our local juris-
prudence. Wick v. Wick' ° establishes the duty of the child to serve
and obey the father. The recognized reciprocal right and duty of the
father to control, protect, support and to guide or educate the child
were established in Lacher v. Venus," in which case Eschweiler, J.,
said:
A natural affection between the pirent and offspring, though it may be nought
but a refined animal instinct and stronger from the parent down than from the
child up, has always been recognized as an inherent, natural right, for the pro-
tection of which, just as much as for the protection of the rights of the individual
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, our government is formed.
Save as modified by the Legislatures of the various states, in
domestic affairs the family has remained in law a self-governing entity,
under the discipline and direction of the father as its head. To some
extent, at least, this domestic harmony has been disrupted by our
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Wisconsin Married Woman's
Act,' 2 in Wait v. Pierce, 3 wherein it was held that the Legislature has
so completely emancipated the married woman as to enable her to sue
her husband in tort for personal injury growing out of his negligence.
It is interesting to note in that case the dissenting opinion of Esch-
weiler, J., who stated that the majority opinion would result in the
conclusion that a husband may likewise sue the wife, and as a necessary
corollary, to permit of lawsuits by a child against a parent, or a parent
against a child, because it abolishes the common-law doctrine, based
as it was upon the idea of the preservation of the family and a refusing
to recognize tort liabilities between its members. Happily, Wick v.
1O3 Minn. 247.
'R.I. (1925) 13 A 198.
'See article by Oliver Wendell Holmes in the Harvard Law Review, Nov.,
1918, wherein he says: "The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be
in that naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by
them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men every-
where." See also, the reply to this statement by the Rev. H. Noonan, in the
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW, Vol. III, p. 91.
:0 Supra.
118 N.W. 613. Cited in Natural and Inherent Rights under the Constitution.
(Dean Schoetz of Marquette School of Law) MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW, Vol. 7,
P. 154 (58).
St. of 1925, 6.o15; St. of 1925, 246.01-246.03; St. of 1925, 246.07; Laws of
1905, c. 17; and Constitution, art. 14, sec. 13.
33 209 N.W. 475.
NOTES AND COMMENT
Wick,34 has put aside that fear by showing that the contrary con-
clusion is possible where the Legislature has not yet touched the filial
relation. The court'15 regrets that the decision in Wait v. Pierce6 was
made necessary by statute and concedes that it did somewhat mar the
symmetry and beauty of the family conception. "However, it did not
destroy it" and our court is not disposed "to impair it further than is
necessary to carry out apparent legislative policies."
Until a change is made "under the legislative banner" and by clear
and categorical declaration our court is committed to a reliance upon
the Natural Law as a basis of domestic conduct.
"Honor thy father and thy mother" is an injunction which contains
as much truth today as it did under the Mosaic dispensation.*
J. P. TAUGHER, '27
Principal and Surety: Statute of 'Frauds; Contracts; Perform-
ance.
Plaintiff in the case of Braasch v. Bondel advanced $3,400 to the
principal defendant for the purpose of making a down payment on the
purchase of a property. On November 24, 1919, the defendant ex-
ecuted a note to the plaintiff for the above amount, for one year at
5 per cent interest per annum. The note in question was endorsed by
the other defendants as accommodation parties. The principal de-
fendant paid interest on the note up to November 24, 1921, at which
time a new agreement was formed, whereby the note was extended,
and a higher rate of interest, namely 6 per cent, subsequently 52 per
cent, was to be paid. The arrangement was made without the knowl-
edge or consent of the accommodation parties. The note was later se-
cured by the execution of a second mortgage on the property above
mentioned.
On August 6, 1925, the plaintiff, payee of the note, brought an ac-
tion to foreclose the mortgage, and asked for a deficiency judgment
against the maker and the accommodation parties. The defendant
contends that at the time of the extension of the original note, the
payee had agreed to forbear until the time of the maturity of the first
mortgage on the property which was November 24, 1925. The ac-
commodation parties answered separately, claiming to be released by
the agreement between the debtor and the plaintiff. Last pa),ment of
interest had been made in May, 1925. No payment of interest had
been made for the six months to November, 1925.
The lower court found for the plaintiff, holding the maker of the
note, i.e. the principal defendant, but released the accommodation
1' Supra.
Supra.
Supra.
* Since the above comment went to press the Supreme Court of Iowa, in
Hovey v. Dohnage, et. al., 212 N.W. 553, has decided that a wife may not sue
her husband for personal injuries even though the statute on which the action
was based (sec. io462, Iowa Code, 1924) was one allowing any woman to re-
cover for personal injury from any person, etc. The reasoning is similar to that
in the dissenting opinion in Wait v. Pierce, supra.
1211 N.W. 28I,--Wis .
